INTRODUCTION

1.01 Almost one year on from Berlin, now is an appropriate time to take stock of

developments and progress in SSR. Security is addressed under Pillar 3 of the Afghan

Development Framework. The synergy between security and sustainable development is well

understood by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; and security sector reform

is seen as being central to sustainable security.

1.02 As stated in the Berlin Declaration of 01 April 2004, overall responsibility for the

coordination of Afghan National Security Policy lies with the National Security Council (NSC)

and the National Security Advisor (NSA), supported by Office of the National Security Council

(ONSC).

1.03 At the grand strategic level, it is the prime function of the NSC to ensure that the security

activities of all Government ministries (MoI, MoD, MoJ, Supreme Court, Attorney Generals

Office and NDS) and the Afghan security forces are first coordinated nationally, and secondly,

but of no lesser importance, that they are coordinated with the supporting efforts of the

International Community (CFC-A, ISAF and UNAMA). Coordination with the International

Community needs to embrace not only those activities that are actively and directly engaged in

opposing the enemies of the state, but also those assisting the SSR strategy (UNAMA and SSR

lead pillar nations and others) and Government development strategies.

1.04 The SSR agenda, as established at the security donors meeting in Geneva in April 2002,

established a strategy that focused on five pillars

each allocated to individual donor nations.

These include: military reform (U.S.), police reform (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), counternarcotics

(U.K.), and disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants

(Japan). The fundamental objective is to strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole, and each

of its individual parts, to provide an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting

service. The long-term success of the SSR Strategy in Afghanistan, and its sustainability over

time, as in any country, will rest largely on the establishment of strong government oversight

mechanisms and reform within responsible ministries; MoI, MoD, NDS, MoJ, Supreme Court

and Attorney General s Office. Issues relating to parliamentary oversight and accountability

will be addressed in 2005 and promulgated in legal statute.

BERLIN AGREEMENT.

1.05 At the March 2004 International Conference on Afghanistan in Berlin, the Government

of Afghanistan committed itself to a SSR strategy that included the following strategic objectives:

i. Demobilisation of 40% of Afghan military forces, using stated troop strength as the base

by June 2004 and including the decommissioning of military units.

ii. Agreement that NATO and the Coalition deploy international military forces in support

of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

iii. Extending full cooperation to the Independent Afghan Human Rights Commission

(IAHRC).

iv. Strengthening Afghanistan s institutional capacity to meet its reporting obligations under

the international instruments to which Afghanistan is a party.

v. Developing human rights monitoring, documenting, and reporting mechanisms with the

international community.

vi. Establishing a Supreme Court according to the Constitution with the necessary capacity

to fulfil its mandate.

vii. Strengthening the administrative and financial capacity of justice institutions.

viii. Accelerating the legislative reform process through adoption of key laws that would be

compatible with the Constitution, including laws and procedures on the civilianisation of

judicial offices, criminal, civil codes and a penitentiary law.

ix. Establishing a national legal training centre.

STRATEGIC COORDINATION

1.06 It is widely acknowledged that the management of change and transition will create

managerial challenges at all levels, from the national to the tactical levels, between different

Afghan national ministries and agencies, and finally between different Afghan national ministries

and agencies, and the International Community. In order to ensure that SSR activities are

coherent at the national level, two strong strategic-level coordinating committees have been

established that have direct responsibilities for the management of the SSR Strategy and NS

Strategy; respectively called the SSR Coordination Committee (SSRCC) and the National

Security Coordination Forum (NSCF). They also have the responsibility, on behalf of the NSC, of

ensuring de-confliction and that their two strategies are mutually reinforcing to the maximum

extent possible. Figure 1.1 below provides diagrammatic representation of the National Security

Policy Coordination mechanisms is below:

Figure 1.1: Security Policy Coordination

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SSR COORDINATION COMMITTEE (1)

ANA STEERING

GROUP

DDR

STEERING

GROUP

CN

STEEERING

GROUP

POLICE

STEERING

GROUP

JUSTICE

REFORM

STEERING

GROUP

NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION

FORUM

PILLAR

MINISTER

LEAD NATION

AMBASSADOR

CFC-A

ISAF

Ad Hoc

Gps (2)

Afghan

Security Forces

GRAND STRATEGIC

STRATEGIC

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

Note 1 - Joint Secretariat from ONSC, CFC-A and UNAMA

Note 2 Election Security?

1.07 The introduction of a management level between the NSC and the various subordinate

steering groups and working groups is designed to enhance both horizontal and vertical coherence

of all SSR and security related issues, There are three levels of management as indicated on the

above diagram: level 1 = political or grand strategic; level 2 = strategic; and level 3 = operational

(policy). In addition to chairing the NSC at level 1, the President chairs the SSR Coordinating

Committee (SSRCC), at level 2. This ensures that the President remains accessible and closely

engaged with the steering groups at level 3. The presence of the NSA as chair of the NSCF, and

as Deputy Chair of the SSRCC will ensure that the activities of the SSRCC and NSCF are

coherent.

SSR COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES

1.08 The SSR Coordination Committee is chaired by the President. He is assisted as chair and

director of the SSRCC by the appointment of two subordinate co-directors: the NSA; and the

SRSG. Commanders CFC-A and ISAF also attend as principals. Commander ISAF s role may

increase as ISAF assumes more security responsibilities from CFC-A. Membership of the SSRCC

will include the co-directors (co-chairs), of the five SSR Steering groups. As per the NSCF, the

secretariat of the SSRCC is jointly provided by the ONSC and CFC-A, and will perform similar

functions to the joint secretariat of the NSCF. The purpose of the SSRCC is to coordinate all SSR

related activities, and to develop strategies and issue directives to ensure effective vertical and

horizontal coherence.

1.09 The first meeting of the reformed SSRCC met 15 February and the second is due to meet

15 March. At the last of the old style SSRCC meetings, at the beginning of 2004, there was only

one single Afghan present and the process was owned and directed by the International

Community. That has now changed fundamentally and irreversibly and the SSRCC and SSR

process is owned and directed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The

new SSRCC is chaired by the President when he is available, or if not the NSA, and is attended

by all Afghan security line ministries and agencies.

1.10 SSR Pillar Groups have established their own coordination mechanisms and working

groups. SSR Steering Groups decide upon their own composition and whether it is necessary to

create their own architecture of supporting sub-groups. They also provide their own secretariats

and decide the frequency of their meetings, but meetings should be at least one per month in order

to prepare for SSRCC monthly meetings. The purpose of the SSR Steering Groups is to

coordinate all activities within their SSR areas of responsibility, to develop strategies and issue

directives to ensure effective vertical and horizontal coherence and the achievement of strategic

goals as directed by the SSRCC.

1.11 An SSR Working Group has been established below the Principals level of the SSRCC

involved in the five SSR pillars from the International Community. The purpose of the SSR

Working Group (SSRWG) is twofold; first to discuss and propose the agenda to the NSA for the

main SSRCC and second, to ensure that the internationals are fully informed, engaged and able to

brief their Principals. The first SSRWG has held 3 March.

1.12 In November 2004 the post of SSR Coordinator was established in the ONSC. On behalf

of the Afghan Government and the NSA, the role of the SSR Coordinator is to effect strategic

coordination between the SSR activities of the International Community and the responsible

Afghan line ministries.

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT BY SSR PILLAR

1.13 SSR Strategy Interim Objectives and Benchmarks: Within the overall context of the

SSR Strategy, each of the 5-pillar lead nations and ministries will be responsible for the

development of their areas of responsibility and will develop their own subordinate but

supportive lines of operation that will need to be collated to ensure coherence. These will relate to

institutional capacity building, including strategic planning competency, and the definition and

achievement of interim objectives, decisive points and mile-stones in the implementation of those

plans. Defined objectives and benchmarks for each SSR pillar are essentially as follows:

DDR

1.14 Objectives and Benchmarks. At the Tokyo Conference of February 2003, Japan, the

US, UK and Canada pledged a total of $50 million to DDR but it was not until 24 October 2003

that reform of the MOD was sufficiently advanced for DDR to begin. The Afghan New

Beginnings Program (ANBP) was then created to implement DDR. Specific DDR objectives and

benchmarks include:

i. Heavy weapon cantonment to be complete in Kabul by 3rd ¼ 2004 and it has been;

ii. Main phase of DDR was to commence by 3rd ¼ 2004, which it did;

iii. Reintegration programs were to fully coordinate with other job creation schemes and

economic development strategies of the Ministries of Reconstruction and Planning and

they have been;

iv. Militias disarmed and demobilised, and heavy weapons cantoned by 2nd ½ 2005 and this

is on track;

v. Disarmament and demobilisation complete by 3rd ¼ 2005 and reintegration by 1st ¼ 2006

and this is on track; and,

vi. Warlords and commanders reconciled and reintegrated with the national government 3rd

¼ 2006. Extant out-reach programs and the use of non-statutory militias will be

rationalised with the DDR program.

1.15 Assessment: The DDR programme, as it was originally conceived is basically on track.

So far in excess of 37,992 members of the AMF have been disarmed, 34,743 demobilised and

33,352 reintegrated since October 2003. Weapons collected total 24,218 and heavy weapons

8,433. There are still some outstanding weapons in the Panshir but they are currently being

addressed. The real concern now, however, relates to the disbandment of illegal armed groups, or

those armed groups that are outside of any central government or MoD control and hence outside

the DDR programme. It is estimated that there are approximately 1,100 such groups totalling

60,000 to 100,000 personnel. These essentially anarchic groups, if not disbanded, could pose a

serious threat to good governance, the elections and exacerbate the threat from narcotics. This is

an issue that the Government and International Community are currently planning to address.

COUNTER NARCOTICS1

1.16 The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy of May 2003, supported by the February

2004 International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan, set out five main areas or lines

of operation to facilitate the Government s CN strategy. These are:

i. Alternative Livelihoods. The development of an integrated cross-ministry approach, to

build capacity and allocate resources to where they will have maximum impact in terms

of alternative livelihoods and reducing poppy production.

1 For a full update on the counter-narcotics strategy and program consult chapter Fighting Drugs and Creating

Alternative Livelihoods .

ii. Law Enforcement. Improvements in interdiction and prosecution rates, including

improved efforts to attack drug-based corruption.

iii. Judicial Reform. The development of drug laws, training for judicial staff and those

handling CN related evidence. Consideration will be given to whether further specific CN

legislation is needed.

iv. Demand Reduction. Awareness training for those who may come into contact with drug

addicts through the course of their normal business, such as teachers, imams and police

officers.

v. Public Awareness. The implementation of regular and effective public awareness

campaigns.

1.17 Assessment: There has been considerable recent progress in the area of counter-narcotics.

In 9/10 December the President launched a major new initiative and announced the establishment

of a stand-alone CN ministry and in conjunction with the UK the new CN minister has developed

a new eight pillar CN implementation plan. Those eight pillars are:

i. Building institutions. An institutional Development programme is being put in place to

support the new CN ministry and to help develop provincial structures. Political

coordination has been improved by the creation of a Cabinet Sub-committee that engages

all strategic stakeholders and the establishment of a CN Trust Fund should encourage

donors and ensure a more cost-effective disbursement of funds.

ii. Information campaign. A comprehensive, multi-media information campaign has been

developed that includes, in addition to the more obvious techniques, the issuance of a

fatwa, road-shows by the Deputy Minister and public commitments by Governors.

iii. Alternative livelihoods. A comprehensive and coordinated alternative livelihoods

programme is being put in place that is built upon existing national and provincial

development programmes. This will be focused on seven key poppy growing provinces.

In addition policies will be put in place to tackle opium indebtedness.

iv. Interdiction and law enforcement. The Afghan Special Narcotics Force and the CN

Police of Afghanistan are both being expanded, and will include a national interdiction

capability. A CN intelligence fusion cell is already in operation and along with the

deployment of a further nine mobile detection teams will better focus targeting. Issues of

governance and corruption will also be addressed.

v. Criminal justice. A CN legal framework has recently been developed that will include a

CN Criminal Justice Task Force, a secure court and prison facility and a new court in

Kabul with jurisdiction to deal with major trafficking cases throughout Afghanistan.

vi. Eradication. There will be a new two pronged eradication strategy in 2005 that will

involve an expanded Central Poppy Eradication Force and a provincial campaign led by

Governors and Chiefs of Police. Verification will be conducted by the formation of 15

ground based verification teams and air assets.

vii. Demand reduction and treatment of addicts. Four new drug addiction treatment

centres will be established making a total of seven, and the Government is seeking

international funding to extend and increase that facility throughout the country.

viii. Regional cooperation. Regional co-operation will be conducted within the framework

of the Good Neighbourly Relations Regional Declaration on Counter Narcotics.2

2 See Chapter on Regional Cooperation.

JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW REFORM

1.18 Strengthening the justice system (Supreme Court, Attorney General s Office, Ministry of

Justice and military justice (Justice Advocate) is central to the Government s vision for

Afghanistan: A legitimate and functioning State that provides for the security and prosperity of

its citizens and contributes to regional and global security.

1.19 The Justice and Rule of Law National Priority Program (NPP) is designed to strengthen

the justice system by providing the physical infrastructure, professional personnel and

coordination needed to implement and enforce the law. This should pave the way towards a

legitimate, stable, prosperous and equitable society based on democracy and international

standards. The NPP strategy is based upon seven sub-programs or lines of operation:

i. Law reform;

ii. Justice Survey;

iii. Justice infrastructure and in particular courthouse construction;

iv. Legal training;

v. Legal awareness; capacity building; and

vi. Procurement of equipment and vehicles.

1.20 And more immediately: (i) reviewing and simplifying existing legislation, and the recent

entry into force of an Interim Criminal Procedure Code has been a major enhancement (ii)

enhancing the understanding of the rights and obligations of individuals as members of Afghan

society; and (iii) establishing defence lawyers. Objectives and benchmarks were agreed that

related to the following:

i. Appointment of Supreme Court 1st ¼ 2005.

ii. Appointment of prosecutors and legal defenders 1st ¼ 2006.

iii. Rehabilitation of physical premises and communication means across the country

complete in Kabul and 50% of the judicial buildings at provincial and district level by

2006.

iv. Creation of legal training system combining both Shari a and Secular Law 1st ¼ 2006.

v. Establishment of an organization comprising practicing lawyers with due regard to legal

aid.

vi. Appointment of primary and provincial judges 1st ¼ 2007.

vii. Codification of Laws (establish bar process) 2006-2009.

viii. Establishment of nationwide judicial training centre 2006.

ix. Establishment of Judiciary 1st ¼ 2007.

x. Refurbishment and staffing of prison system complete 1st ¼ 2007.

1.21 Achievements: A criminal procedure code was passed and gazetted in 2004 and a

juvenile code in February 2005. Penitentiary law is close to completion. 600 judges, attorneys,

lawyers and jurists have been trained through an 18 month course. A new legal curriculum for the

faculty of Law and Legal Science has been developed but is not yet in practice. Plans have been

developed for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of provincial prisons but funding is only in

place for four, which leaves a very significant short-fall.

1.22 General Assessment: There are some significant plans in place to improve justice

generally but, due to a lack of funding, there is likely to be a shortfall between plans and practice

and as a consequence there is a danger that SSR progress elsewhere could be jeopardized. The

reform of the prison service, and the refurbishment and construction of prisons is well behind

schedule.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP).

1.23 The Ministry of Interior provides nation-wide law enforcement services and manages

local governance in all provinces and districts throughout Afghanistan. In partnership with the

international community, the Ministry of Interior is diligently working toward creating a safe and

secure environment by building the capacity and professionalism of its police and border police

forces. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior is in the process of implementing administrative

reforms at the district and provincial levels.

1.24 While the last two years have been a hard struggle in the overall sense of reform and

reconstruction in Afghanistan, much have been achieved with respect to benchmark set forth in

Bonn Agreement. The fight against terrorism3 was and still continues to be a top priority.

Therefore, the Afghanistan Government has recently enacted several new laws to combat

terrorism:

1.25 The MoI has requested an accelerated basic police training program in order to meet a

deployment goal of 50,0004 police officers nationwide by December 2005. This will depend on

the delivery of donor pledges to the Law and Order Trust Fund. When donors do not fulfil their

pledges, the tendency is to offset shortfalls against salaries, which can have a major negative

effect upon the law and order program as a whole. Reform of the ANP should be seen as a major

element of the Justice and Rule of Law reform program described above. Key interim objectives

and benchmarks relate to:

i. ANP structure complete, manned, trained and equipped to establishment, 62,000: 1st ¼

2006: 122,000: 4th 1/4 2007.

ii. ANP able to enforce and maintain the law nationally by 1st ¼ 2007. This may be

graduated by regions and provinces.

iii. Enhanced physical structures at the provincial and district levels.

iv. Enhanced mechanisms to strengthen cooperation between police and prosecutors for the

handling of criminal cases.

v. The full deployment of highway police patrols with appropriate infrastructure, vehicles

and equipment.

vi. The establishment of a range of revenue generating initiatives designed to increase the

central government budget, enhance public security, safe-guard the environment and

eventually lessen the burden on donors. These initiatives may include; the registration of

vehicles, vehicle inspection, traffic regulations, public transport operator permits and the

licensing of private security firms.

vii. Increasing perception of Afghan people in capacity of the ANP to guarantee their access

to justice linked to judges and judicial process.

3 One of these laws is the counter-terrorism law incorporating all twelve international conventions on terrorism.

Having forty-six articles, the counter-terrorism law has prescribed the harshest punishments the human rights

documents would allow for any terrorist. Three other laws that have begun to play a vital role in combating terrorism in

Afghanistan are: (i) the law against money laundering income from a criminal source (ii) the law against financing

terrorism (iii) and a security organizations law barring terrorists to bear arms.

4 The total numbers of ANP are currently under discussion and could eventually exceed 60,000.

1.26 Assessment. While recruitment into the ANP would appear to be going relatively well,

reform within the MoI is behind schedule. Personnel and pay policies have been developed and

implemented, however, virtually all other areas of institutional development and strategic

planning are either off-track or behind schedule.

1.27 An important project on the civilian side of the Ministry of Interior is the introduction

of national ID card system. This project addresses the urgent need to assign and issue ID cards to

the entire population of Afghanistan. As a result, not only all citizens of Afghanistan, both male

and female, will be assigned and issued ID cards, but a reliable database of the population will be

created, which is vital for the national level of planning for education, health and other social

sectors. Due to the significant, initial funding requirement, the Government failed to identify or

secure any donor funding for this project.

1.28 A new proposed pay and grade structure is currently under review. The Ministry of

Interior would rather have a smaller force which is well equipped, well trained, and well paid than

one that is over-extended and not supported by proper infrastructure. The aforementioned

requirements reflect the urgent need of the Afghan Police Force to receive greater assistance from

the International Community in the short-term. Extending the police force size is not the answer.

Building quick capacity of a smaller force with requisite funding and equipment in the short-term

will pay greater dividends to all Afghans and international stakeholders in the long-term and

ensure the enduring commitment of the police officers in the process. To that end, there is a need

to quickly formulate an international police mentoring program to ensure that those recent police

graduates in the field are following the correct tenets of internationally accepted police standards

within their respective communities and that they are given the right tools to develop and hone

professional policing skills. This will need to be done in parallel with support for equipment, as

outlined in Box 1.1 below.

Box 1.1: Logistical Challenges in Law Enforcement

The Ministry of Interior has approximately 22,000 serviceable weapons, mainly AK-47 s. There is a need

for at least 30,000 side arms and another 20,000 AK-47 s. Funding is also required for much needed

ammunition. The MOI recently purchased 1,476 Russian Jeeps to augment its small fleet of existing

vehicles. UNOPS is operating approximately 1,100 of the same type of jeeps for election monitoring

purposes which will be turned over to the MOI after the elections. In addition, different types of vehicles,

including pickup trucks and buses, have been donated directly by Germany and Japan. This brings the

total MOI fleet of serviceable vehicles to about 3,000. Despite these efforts, the ratio of police officers

per vehicle is still too high. The identified shortfall totals around 5,500 vehicles. A nation-wide

communications system remains a problem for the Ministry of Interior. Last year, Motorola entered into

negotiations with the Ministry to build a comprehensive nation-wide communications system (does not

include border police communications currently being funded by US DOD). However, shortfalls in donor

funding have placed this project on hold until the new budget year. A distinctive new uniform for Afghan

police was introduced last year. Approximately 7,000 police officers have already been outfitted by the

United States Government. More funds are required to equip the rest of police force with new uniforms

complete with personal gear, rain gear, and cold weather gear.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)

1.29 Much has been achieved since December 2002, when the Presidential Decree creating the

ANA was signed. The reform of the MoD and General Staff began in September. The purpose

being to create a national multi-ethnic, cohesive MoD by establishing an organising structure,

functional procedures, and a professional trained staff able to provide effective strategic direction,

policy resources and coordination of military institutions and operations. The ANA has assumed

responsibility for all of its own training and units of the ethnically diverse Central Corps have

been deployed on combat operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and in support of the civil

authorities and police in the North.

i. Central Corps trained and ready for role 3rd ¼ 2004;

ii. Regional Corps HQ and lead elements deployed 4th ¼ 2004;

iii. Regional brigades larger and able to dominate militia in their tactical areas of

responsibility 3rd ¼ 2005;

iv. Regional brigades trained and deployable 1st ¼ 2006;

v. ANA capable of conducting independent brigade and battalion level operations; and,

vi. ANA assume responsibility for counter insurgency campaign.

1.30 Assessment. The reform programme in the MoD has gone well and is on track in virtually

all areas of institutional development, human resources and operational competency. In

December 2004 the MOD released its first National Defence Plan. It is currently anticipated that

the ANA will be close to 80 to 90% of full establishment by 1 December 2006

CONCLUSION

1.31 There has been enormous progress in the five SSR pillars in the last year. That progress

however, has until recently not been coordinated or synchronized. As a consequence, where

progress has been less advanced, as in the justice pillar and MoI, it places progress in other areas

in jeopardy. Since October, and with the appointment of the SSR Coordinator within the ONSC, a

mechanism for strategic coordination has been put in place and is having a beneficial effect. The

recommencement of the SSR Coordination Committee, as a tight executive body under Afghan

ownership is also already paying dividends. The challenge of disarming illegal groups is under

Afghan ownership and the strategic coordination of the NSA. Once this strategic coordination is

proven, operational control of the disbandment process will be transferred to the responsible

Afghan line ministries. This is all indicative of a gathering momentum in SSR, which, if it is

resourced and maintained, bodes well for the future security of Afghanistan.