Ali Wardak
University of Glamorgan, UK
Abstract
This paper examines the institution of jirga, its main forms, and the different social contexts in
which each form operates as a mechanism of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. It is argued that
jirga as a traditional Afghan institution is closely bound up with the social and economic realities
of every day life in Afghanistan and is deeply rooted in the culture and history of the people of the
country. The focus of analysis, in this paper, is the Pashtun model, which is more elaborate and
emulated to varying degrees by non-Pashtun Afghans (Carter and Connor1989; Glatzer 1998). It
is argued that jirga as a time-honoured institution does not only resolve many local, tribal, and
national conflicts efficiently and in cost-effective ways, but also acts as a powerful channel of
communication among the people of Afghanistan. It, therefore, plays a central role in
strengthening social solidarity among Afghans and contributes significantly to the maintenance
of social order in Afghan society. However, the extent of the effectiveness of jirga as a mechanism
of conflict resolution depends on the extent to which it is perceived as legitimate by the various
segments of the Afghan population. It is maintained that there is a continued need for jirga in
resolving many contemporary local, tribal and national conflicts in post-war Afghanistan. But, at
the same time, this traditional Afghan institution needs to adapt to the new global cultural milieu
that is being created by the forces of globalisation; it needs to be a more inclusive institution that
represents both men and women and to be more sensitive to the universally accepted principles of
Human Rights. Both past and current experiences show that there is reason to believe that jirga
has the capacity to bridge tradition with modernity and to face the challenges of the 21
st century.
Introduction
Conflicts are as old as human societies themselves. Historically, individuals, social groups and
societies have disputed and competed against one another over scarce commodities and resources
- land, money, political power, and ideology. They have even fought one another and bitterly
sought the elimination and/or subjugation of rivals, in order to control these resources and
commodities. But at the same time, human societies and groups have found their own ways and
means for averting and/or resolving conflicts. The existing body of literature confirms that the
nature and causes of conflicts and the mechanisms for resolving them are deeply rooted in the
culture and history of every society; they are in many important ways unique to them.
Panchayat
in India (Baxi and Gallanter 1979; Moore 1985), Mediation Committees in China (Li 1978; Clark
1989), and
jirga in Afghanistan (Carter and Connor1989;Elphinstone 1992; Olesen 1995; Gletzer
1998) that operate as informal mechanisms of conflict resolution differ from one another
significantly. More importantly, all these traditional forms of conflict resolution are
fundamentally different from the ways conflicts are resolved in much of the Western world
(Reichel 1998).
These comparative social facts would seem to support the philosophical position of cultural
relativists who have long argued that the nature of all social phenomena, including conflicts and
their resolution, are relative and culturally specific (Harris 1968; Spiro 1986). While this
2
viewpoint has a solid foundation in philosophy and social theory, the nature of human
relationships in the 21
st century has been radically changing with the increasing globalisation of
economic, social, and political relationships among nations. (Robertson 1992). Cultural relativists
may need, at least in some important ways, to rethink their position vis-à-vis the realities of social
relationships in the 21
st century. Since conflicts are a form of social relationships (though
negative), they are bound to become more globalised and so are their resolutions.
Indeed, the complex global nature of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA, their global
sources and causes, and the global efforts to respond to terrorism (and to its causes) confirm this.
These developments are certainly pointing to the fact that the time has arrived when people from
different cultures and civilisations will have to engage with one another as equal partners in the
resolution of national and international conflicts and in understanding their causes; it is time that
different cultures learned from one another and contributed to the emerging ‘global culture’ that
is reflective of its numerous constituent elements, widely shared and ethical.
Jirga – a traditional
mechanism of conflict resolution in Afghanistan – has a strong potential to contribute to this
culture. This paper, after defining the concept of
jirga and examining its status as a national
Afghan institution, will focus on an analysis of
maraka, qawmi jirga, and loya jirga as the main
forms of traditional conflict resolution in Afghan society. But first, it is important to place the
subject under examination in the general context of the current social and political situation in
Afghanistan that has been strongly shaped by nearly a quarter of a century long conflict in the
country.
The Impact of War on Afghan Society
Since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the country has been used as
battlefield between competing global and regional powers and groups - a battlefield between the
former Communist USSR and the Capitalist West (mainly the USA) in the 1980s; a battlefield
between Pakistan, the Arab Gulf countries, on the one hand, and Iran and Russia in the 1990s on
the other; and more recently a battlefield between foreign Muslim fundamentalist groups and a
right-wing US administration. In this process of rivalry, Afghanistan’s main immediate
neighbours infiltrated deep into Afghan politics. With competing interests in the country, they
created their client factions/warlords and sponsored them militarily, financially and politically.
These factions had gradually become so dependent on their foreign sponsors that they saw
Afghanistan’s interests through the eyes of these foreigners. The neighbours also exploited
Afghanistan’s existing ethnic and religious composition and justified their interventions on the
grounds that they had common religious and ethnic ties with their clients. Thus the armed
conflict, which continued for several years even after the defeat of the (former) Red Army,
resulted in the extensive destruction of Afghanistan’s economic, political and social
infrastructure. The Western world, particularly the USA, which financially, politically and
militarily supported the Afghan
mujahedin (Islamic warriors) and lured the Soviets to invade
Afghanistan (Brezinzski 1998, Cooley 2002), almost completely abandoned the ruined country
after the Red Army was defeated.
The destruction of the country’s economic infrastructure, particularly, provided opportunities for
the foreign players and their client Afghan warring factions to exploit the situation in seeking
their strategic goals and sectarian interests at the expense of the Afghan population. The almost
total collapse of Afghan pre-war economy gradually resulted in the emergence of a ‘war
economy’ (Rubin 1999) - economic conditions that mainly centred on the manufacturing, repair,
use and smuggling of weapons and ammunition, on the one hand, and on the smuggling (and
production) of illicit drugs and national treasure on the other. What is particularly important to
3
mention is that the 24 year long conflict also resulted in a generation of young people who were
largely deprived of gaining educational qualifications and other useful skills. This ‘war
generation’ of thousands of young people has also been deeply traumatised by the war - many lost
their parents, relatives and homes. This situation enabled the various factions to recruit their
fighters from this war generation so that the conflict in which they had a stake continued.
Fighting for one or the other warlord provided these young men with a source of income, social
status, and a way of channelling their young energies. More importantly, this situation provided
the opportunity for foreign Muslim fundamentalist groups - mainly the
Al-Qa’ada - to use Afghan
soil as headquarters for terrorist activities against other nations. There now exists an increasingly
convincing body of evidence, which links the Afghanistan-based
Al-Qa’ada to the 11 September
terrorist attacks on New York’s Twin Towers and on other targets in the United States.
The September 11 terrorist attacks, which deeply shocked the world, appear to have had a strong
impact on global policy, particularly on US’s policy towards Afghanistan. These events seem to
have convinced US policy makers that the social, political and economic environments that breed
terrorism are no longer confined within the national boundaries of nation states. Instead, they
have clear transnational manifestations, and therefore, such environments need the attention of
the international community. Indeed, the current international military engagement, economic
reconstruction plans, and the political stabilisation of Afghanistan, are partly, aimed at the reintegration
of Afghanistan into the global community. These efforts may, for the first time in the
past 24 years, provide common grounds between the interests of the international community and
the interests of the ordinary Afghan people. Central to political stabilisation and to the reestablishment
of social and political order in Afghanistan is the institution of
jirga - one of the
least researched aspects of Afghan culture and society.
The Concept and Definition of Jirga
According to the Pashto Descriptive Dictionary (1978: 1272)
jirga is an original Pashto word,
which in its common usage refers to the gathering of a few, or a large number of people; it also
means consultation according to this source. The word
jirga is also used in Persian/Dari.
According to
Ghyathul-Lughat (1871:119) it is derived from jirg, which means a 'wrestling ring',
or 'circle', but is commonly used to refer to the gathering of people. Other scholars believe that
the word
jirga originates from Turkish where it has a very similar meaning to those in Pashto and
Persian/Dari (Faiz-zad 1989: 5). These meanings of
jirg and jirga strongly reflect the rituals and
processes of the Pashtun traditional tribal
jirga where people gather and sit in a large circle in
order to resolve disputes and make collective decisions about important social issues. Rubin
(1995: 42), a prominent scholar, describes the institution of
jirga in this way: ‘The jirga includes
all adult males and rules by consensus. In theory, a
jirga can be convened at any level of tribal
organisation, from the smallest lineage to an entire confederation.
Jirgas are most commonly held
at the lineage level, but there are larger tribal or even inter-tribal
jirgas as well, at least among the
eastern Pashtuns.’ While this description depicts almost all the important aspects of this
traditional Afghan social institution, Rafi (2002: 6) a contemporary Afghan scholar, has formally
defined the concept and says that
jirga is '... that historical and traditional institution and
gathering of the Afghans, which over the centuries, has resolved our nation's all tribal and
national political, social, economic, cultural and even religious conflicts by making authoritative
decisions'.
Despite the generic nature of this definition, it provides a comprehensive framework for the
various dimensions of the institution of
jirga, the different levels at which it operates as a
mechanism of conflict resolution, and the kinds of conflicts that it is designed to resolve. The
4
jirga
is a traditional institution that is more strongly bound up with the tribal economy and society
of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan who estimatedly constitute around half of the total Afghan
population (Dupree 1980; Canfield 1986; Hayman 1992; Glatzer 1998; Wardak 2003). It is,
therefore, more commonly and effectively used as a mechanism of conflict resolution among the
Pashtuns as the authors of an important field study - ‘Contemporary Afghan Councils’ - state:
The prototype in Afghanistan, the
jirga, is the product of Pashtun tribal society and
operates according to the dictates of the
pashtunwali, an inclusive code of conduct
guiding all aspects of Pashtun behaviour and often superseding the dictates of both Islam
and the central government. Thus, in the tribal Pashtun areas, local
jirga settles (nearly)
all issues, unless assistance is requested from another tribe or the government. (Carter
and Connor1989: 7)
Indeed,
jirga has over the centuries, operated as an important mechanism of conflict resolution
among the Pashtuns, and has contributed to the maintenance of social order in the rest of the
Afghan society both in direct and indirect ways. But, the centrality of
jirga in the resolution of
tribal conflicts in accordance to tribal customs has, sometimes, been interpreted as a challenge to
the authority of the central state. It has, therefore, been considered as a rival to the state by certain
governments in Afghan history. However, despite attempts by certain Afghan governments to
expand their formal control throughout the country - through the pre-emption of the village
malik
(a liaison person between the government and the local people) system, the introduction of
district and rural development councils, the imposition of Marxism, and theocracy - the Pashtun
social institutions, including the
jirga, have remained relatively intact. This has been particularly
the case with those Pashtun areas that had strong tribal structures and were located far from urban
centres. In large urban centres, however, where non-Pashtuns and Pashtuns were mixed, or where
non-Pashtuns predominated, the central government was able to assert its formal authority more
fully. In these parts of the country, most conflicts were resolved by formal agencies of the Afghan
State. The pre-war Afghan legal system was broadly based on Western (particularly French)
conception of ‘legality’ and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, mainly on the
Hanafi School
(Kamali 1985). It generally reflected a balance between Islamic teachings, Afghan tribal
traditions (customary law) and modern legal norms. The administration of this legal system,
however, involved long delays, bribery and corruption. Judges and magistrates particularly had a
reputation of corruption. Many Afghans in rural areas tried to avoid contact with state legal
institutions and preferred their conflicts to be resolved by
jirgas outside the courtroom (Wardak
2002).
Jirga as a National Afghan Institution
This description of
jirga may be taken as implying that it was an exclusive Pashtun tribal
institution that operated as a mechanism of conflict resolution only in non-urbanised (or less
urbanised) Pashtun populated areas in the south and east of Afghanistan. Many warlords and
faction leaders, who claim to be championing the rights of different ethnic and tribal groups in
Afghanistan, have particularly promoted this view during the past 24 years of Afghan civil
conflict. However, there is emerging evidence which shows that
jirga, or its equivalents, are used
as informal mechanisms of conflict resolution in rural or less urbanised areas where Afghan
Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbaks, predominate as the main (or sole) ethnic group (See Farhadi 2000;
Malekyar 2000; Hashemi 2000). What is striking in these accounts is that there are close
similarities between the Pashtun
jirga and the non-Pashtun shura. Carter and Connor (1989)
confirm that among Afghan Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbaks,
jirga-like councils, which are
commonly referred as
shura, operated as a mechanism of conflict resolution. These Afghans dealt
5
with relatively less serious conflicts, problems and issues informally through
shura which, Carter
and Connor (1989: 9) operationally define in this way: ‘A
shura is a group of individuals which
meets only in response to a specific need in order to decide how to meet the need. In most cases,
this need is to resolve a conflict between individuals, families, groups of families, or whole
tribes.’ This description would seem to indicate that
shura and jirga, are fundamentally very
similar Afghan informal (non-state) mechanisms of conflict resolution that operate in varying
social and tribal contexts. In fact, many of the concepts and techniques such as ‘
ozrkhahi’,
‘nagha’, ‘molamat’
, ‘ras-e-qaum’, ‘reeshsafidan’ that are used in the process of dispute
settlement among Afghan Hazaras (Malekyar 2000: 62 – 71) are the exact equivalents (in
Dari
language) of those used in the process of the Pashtun tribal
jirga.
Carter and Connor (1989) further add that, unlike the strongly institutionalised and egalitarian
jirga,
the shura, which has been significantly militarised during the past 24 years of Afghan war,
is more like a short-term advisory council of elders, landlords,
khans and military commanders
without clearly defined rules. Also the
shura often deals with civil conflicts and military issues,
the resolution of which is strongly influenced by landlords,
khans, and more recently by warlords
and military commandeers. More importantly, Carter and Connor’s (1989: 10) study further
reveals that because of these reasons and because of Pashtuns’ expertise in conflict resolutions, as
well as due to their large population size and dispersion through much of Afghanistan, ‘…it was
not uncommon for a non-Pashtun groups to request local Pashtun elders hold a
jirga to settle a
non-Pashtun conflict, suggesting that the Pashtun
jirga traditionally had more impact than its non-
Pashtun counterpart, the
shura.’ In these situations, even non-Pashtuns refer to these processes of
conflict resolution as
jirga.
This field observation clearly indicates the fact that Afghans, whatever their ethnic/tribal origin,
have over the centuries emulated each other’s behaviour - Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbaks,
Turkmans and other Afghan ethnic and tribal groups have all made their unique contributions to
Afghan culture that is more than the total sum of its constituent parts. The contributions of Tajiks
to Afghan arts and literature, the Hazaras and Qizelbashs’ contributions to civil society and urban
entrepreneurship, the Uzbak and Turkman’s contribution to trade and commerce, and the
important contributions of smaller Afghan ethnic and tribal groups have all printed their stamp on
what is today referred to as Afghan culture. Despite the relative under-representation of Hazara,
Uzbak and Turkman cultural traditions at national level, the richness of Afghan national culture
owes much to this centuries old multi-cultural fusion among the various tribal/ethnic cultural
traditions in Afghanistan. This situation has, in turn, contributed to the development of crosstribal
and cross-ethnic national institutions that can only be called Afghan. This is clearly
manifested in the fact that the institution of
jirga has been translated into the national political life
of Afghan society - the two houses of Afghan parliament have been named as
wolasi jirga
(Lower House) and
mashrano jirga (Upper House) and the periodically held grand Afghan
assembly as
loya jirga. Thus, whatever the origin of jirga, and whatever the extent of its
prevalence as a mechanism of conflict resolution among various Afghan ethnic/tribal groups, it
has national currency.
Traditional Structures of Authority and Levels of Jirga
The notion of ‘authority’ has been extensively discussed by classical as well as modern social and
political thinkers. It has been described in different ways depending on the form of authority that
is exercised in a specific social context. In order to understand the different forms of authority
and the ways they apply to the institution of
jirga, it is important to draw on Max Weber's (1964)
work in which he distinguished three forms of authority: a, 'traditional', b. 'rational-legal', and c,
6
'charismatic' authority. Charismatic authority, according to Weber is a kind of exceptional (or
divine) endowment of grace that is imputed by followers to leaders. Contemporary examples of
this form of authority may be the authority of Mahatma Ghandi, Martin L. King, and Ayatollah
Khomeini. Legal-rational authority, on the other hand, according to Weber is the authority of
highly organised groups such as that of the modern state. And finally traditional authority for
Weber is the semi-political decisions made by chiefs of tribes in societies where formal processes
of governance do not exist, or are not fully institutionalised. These concepts will be used to
theoretically inform the discussion about the exercise of authority in the processes of conflict
resolution in Afghan society.
Although the main structure of authority in Afghan society include the extended family, the
locally based clan (or sub-tribe), the tribe, large ethnic group, and the state (Wardak 2002), for the
purposes of this paper I will focus on the ways authority is exercised within the context of
jirga.
However, before examining the main social contexts within which ‘public’ conflicts are dealt
with by
jirga, it is important to mention that most conflicts that are considered ‘private’ are
resolved within the Afghan extended family that the Pashtun refer to as
kahol and the Tajik and
Hazaras as
khanawada, or khanadan. Afghans consider this patriarchal social unit where
two or more generations of blood-related relatives live together in a
Kayla/qal’a (usually
a mud and stone built Afghan Castle) or in a cluster of adjacent houses, as ‘ the cornerstone
of society’. The oldest man in the family - grandfather/father - is the undisputed
figure of authority. The fact that grandfather/father controls the family’s shared sources
further strengthen his position as the main figure of authority, which is also strongly
sanctioned by Islamic teachings. Because of these reasons, father/grandfather plays a
decisive role in the resolution of disputes that are considered ‘private’
Thus, a great deal of potentially serious disputes, relating to domestic violence, divorce,
inheritance, arrangements of marriages are settled within the ‘private’ sphere of the
Afghan extended family without the involvement of local/tribal or state institutions.
In
this way, many potentially serious conflicts are screened at the familial level; they are dealt with
on the spot before becoming a public problem, and a burden on other societal institutions - one of
these societal institutions is
jirga that is examined at local, tribal and national levels, below.
I:
Maraka - Local Jirga
The concepts of
jirga and maraka (often pronounced mraka) as informal mechanisms of conflict
resolution among the Pashtun of Afghanistan are often used interchangeably. However, some
Afghan experts on the subject make an important distinction between the two. Atayee (1979: 39)
says that ‘The difference between
maraka and jirga is that the jirga is to investigate and settle
problems of small importance. Members of
maraka are elders of the various psha (plarina) of one
khel
. The jirga considers and settles problems of great importance and its members are the elders
of various
khels concerned.’ (See also Rafi 2002). The fact that members of maraka comprise of
elders of one
khel (often a single village-based kinship group) clearly indicates that it is generally
a local village institution. Therefore, I will use the term
maraka, throughout this section, to refer
to the micro-level village (or inter-village) based local mechanism of conflict resolution.
The social organisation of
maraka as a local village-based institution will be further examined
later in this section
, but first it is important to describe the social and cultural context within
which it operates as a mechanism of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The most immediate
context within which
maraka operates is the kinship group that is referred to among Afghan
7
Pashtuns as
khel. According to Atayee (1979) khel is a sub-section of a tabar, tribe. A khel
comprises several immediate kinship groups that are called
pllarina (or plarganey). A plarina
includes several extended families, or
kahols, that are related to one another by a common
ancestor, and whose members have intense reciprocal relationships among themselves. Thus,
plarina
represents the smallest unit of tribal formation and the most immediate kinship group of
distant relatives who refer to one another as cousins. Members of several
plarinas (or a khel)
usually live in a single
kalay, village, and normally share public facilities such as the mosque,
water spring, mill, and water canals etc. But, members of a large size
khel may live in more than
one
kalay. Occasionally, a very large khel may comprise of tens of smaller khels, and therefore
form a tribe in its sown right. An example of this is the Suleimankhel branch of the Ghalzai
Pashtuns. However, what is crucial to the current discussion is that it is the village-based
khel
within the context of which, ‘public’ matters - as opposed to ‘private’ matters that are dealt with
by
kahol and plarina - are settled by a maraka.
Maraka
as a local institution of conflict resolution, is closely related to the social and economic
organisation of
kalay. As the overwhelming majority of Afghans are agricultural farmers, it is
mainly the agricultural farm, the orchard, the water-spring and canal, the water-mill, animal
husbandry, vineyard, orchard and the manufacturing of basic agricultural tools around which
kalay
is socially and economically organised. The average Pashtun kalay is a small socioeconomic
unit that normally consists of a several clusters of extended families whose members
are usually related to a common ancestor. The average size of
kalay may range from about 50 to
200 individuals. It is generally a self-sufficient socio-economic unit within which people are not
only related to one another through blood ties, but also through general reciprocal relationships.
They reciprocate agricultural tools, goods, gifts, favours and services. At a
plarina level, the
norms of reciprocity are governed by
trabgani. Trabgani refers to the established patterns of
behaviour which guides members about who to co-operate with, who to compete with, who to
marry, and in a word how to live as
tarboor - an equal and respectable member of the kin group;
it is both a source of cohesion and divisive rivalry among members of a
plarina in different
circumstances (
Trabgani is mistakenly interpreted as rivalry/enmity by some writers including
Rubin 1995). However, at a more general level, it is
pashtunwali that guides the normative
aspects of social relationships (including reciprocal relationships) among members of the
khel,
and constitutes an important aspect of the social order of
kalay. As will be examined in more
details in the next section,
pashtunwali refers to the general code of behaviour for a Pashtun as an
autonomous and respectable member of society. It is important to mention that some prominent
Afghanologists assert that
pashtunwali has, to varying degrees, influenced other Afghan tribal
and ethnic groups too. According to Dupree (1980: 127) ‘ The values of the Pashtun and the
Muslim religion, modified by local customs, permeate in varying degrees all other groups.’ This
is also confirmed by Newell and Newell (1981: 23) who say that
pashtunwali ‘…has influenced
other groups within the country who must deal with similar environment and social realties.’
It is this social and economic context of the
khel and kalay within which maraka operates as a
mechanism of conflict resolution. The existing body of literature shows that
maraka has not been
defined formally. However, looking at the different aspects and elements of
maraka as outlined in
this literature, it may be described as
a local institution of dispute settlement that incorporates a
prevalent (time and space-bound) narkh, institutionalised rituals, and a body of marakachian
whose prikra about a dispute (or problem) is binding on the parties involved.
This description
indicates that
narkh, institutionalised rituals, marakachian and prikra constitute the fundamental
elements of
maraka. Thus, an assembly of a khel’s members without the materialisation of one, or
more of these elements may be considered as an ordinary gathering rather than as a
maraka.
8
Narkh
refers to the centuries-old body of the civil and penal tribal ‘customary laws’. While these
‘laws’ are totally unwritten, they are part of the collective consciousness of
kalay. This is
summed up in the Pashto proverb ‘
De watan na wowza kho de narkh na ma waza’, which means
that ‘you may abandon your tribe/homeland, but you can not abandon
narkh.’ This implies that
these customary laws have profound existence in the minds of local people. However, it is the
narkhey
(expert of narkh) who has a detailed knowledge of these laws, their applications and
related procedures. According to Atayee (1979:67) the best known
narkhs are the Ahmadzai
narkh
and the Razmak narkh. The Ahmadzai narkh has two versions, namely the Esa narkh and
the
Musa narkh. While the first is considered as strict and precise, the second is more general, but
sufficiently flexible to suite different situations. Some
khels and tribes in eastern and southern
Afghanistan have developed their own
narkhs that are more applicable to their local social and
economic conditions. Nevertheless, the
Ahmadzai and the Razmak narkhs are generally followed
as sources of reference among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. In fact,
narkh at a more general level,
reflects the fundamental values and norms that are associated with
pashtunwali.
However,
narkh has to be placed in the social context of a specific conflict and thoroughly
discussed by
marakachain. The latter refers to all the mashran (elders), speengiri (people with
grey beards), and
speenpatkian (people with white turbans, which means mullahs here) who form
the main body of
maraka. As mentioned earlier, while mashran and speengiri represent various
plarinas
, speenpatkian join them, in order to bless the maraka and to lead the religious aspect of
the
maraka rituals. Mashran and speengiri are rarely religious leaders, but they often have a
working knowledge of ‘folk Islam’, especially of the general principles that relate to conflict
resolution. Although, some
mashran and speengiri are normally experts in narkh, they may be
accompanied by a
narkhey who often belongs to a different khel. This is to ensure that the
relevant customary laws are properly and fairly applied.
Institutionalised rituals form a necessary, but less important element of
maraka. The nature and
quality of
maraka rituals vary in accordance with the nature of the issue that is dealt with and
with the kind of technique of conflict resolution that is used. For instance, the rituals of
rogha
(reconciliation/mediation) in a criminal case are different from those of a
rogha in non-criminal
disputes. In addition, since
maraka mostly deals with civil and relatively less serious criminal
matters - such as violation of one’s local grazing rights, water rights, disputes over agricultural
farm or on its boundaries, feuds over symbolic resources between members of a
khel, and
relatively minor bodily harm - its related rituals are not as elaborate as those of a tribal
jirga.
Nevertheless,
maraka is normally held in a specially designated open and public place or in the
village mosque, especially during winter. Only some
marakas that involve sensitive local issues
are conducted secretly without the participation of ordinary people. Some
marakas are scheduled
for the arrival of
Eid (the first non-fasting day after Ramadan, and the day of pilgrimage of
Makka
). Since Eid is a day of communal joy and celebration, it is a uniquely appropriate occasion
for sharing the joy among all members of the village including the disputants. The
maraka
usually starts by the recitation of verses from the holy
Qura’an, and ends with du’a (prayer); both
rituals are led by the
speenpatkey.
Depending on the physical location of the place where a
maraka is held, marakachian form the
inner circle of the gathering; ordinary members of the village sit in an outer circle. While ordinary
people are allowed to listen to the proceedings, they normally do not get involved in the actual
discussions. However, the ordinary participants are not just spectators. Instead, they carefully
observe the
jirga process; their presence is a reminder to the marakachian that the village is
watching what they say and what they decide on. Thus,
maraka is a multi-dimensional process of
communication between the various parties involved - it is not only a form of communication
between the disputants, and among the disputants and the
marakachian, but also a
9
communication among all of these and the apparently silent village. This complex process of
direct and indirect communication among members of the village functions as the main source of
its social cohesion as a unified community - it reaffirms that
kalay has a shared morality, the
violation of which is not acceptable. It also ensures that the violator must pay the price for his/her
violation, so that the actual harm inflicted (on the victim) and the symbolic damage caused to the
moral order of the village are compensated.
A very important aspect of
maraka is prikra, which means maraka’s final decision (ruling) about
the settlement of a specific conflict. The nature of
prikra varies in accordance to the specific form
of
maraka. According to Atayee (1979) there are two forms of maraka. The first one is called
‘
wak maraka’, which is empowered to investigate, discuss
