HUMAN RIGHTS AND

RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

New York

April, 2002

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Credit: University of Texas, Perry-Casteñada Library

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We are grateful to all the Afghans and international aid workers who consented to be

interviewed for this report. It is clear that the main reason for optimism about

Afghanistan’s future lies in the courage and resilience of the Afghan people, and the

dedication and commitment of aid workers.

It is not possible to thank by name all those who assisted the CESR human rights

assessment mission. Particular mention goes to the Human Rights Adviser’s Office in

Afghanistan for providing financial and logistical support, and to the dedicated staff at

the Committee for Rehabilitation Aid to Afghanistan for arranging the mission in

Peshawar and Jalalabad. We also thank the Board of Global Ministries, United

Methodist Church, for additional financial support.

The mission participants were Hadi Ghaemi, Roger Normand, Omar Zachilwal, and

Sarah Zaidi. Hakimi Aziz, Haider Ghulam, and Santa served as facilitators and

translators. Roger Normand was the primary author and editor of this report, with Sarah

Zaidi (chapter 2), Hadi Ghaemi (annex 3) and Omar Zachilwal (chapter 4). Christophe

Wilcke helped edit the report, and Julian Liu did the layout.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (DRAFT)

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Peace and Security

Food Security and Agriculture

Education

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (DRAFT)

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United Nations Development Assistance Framework

World Bank Comprehensive Development Framework

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (DRAFT)

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This report presents the findings of a human rights assessment mission to Afghanistan,

undertaken in January 2002 by the Center for Economic and Social Rights. To provide

a snapshot of local human rights priorities, the CESR mission interviewed a crosssection

of Afghans and international aid workers. Its overall purpose was to offer them

a platform for defining their own human rights and reconstruction priorities.

The interview sample consisted of 135 Afghans – 25 leaders and intellectuals, 58

members of community focus group, and 52 randomly selected individuals – and 42

international aid workers. Geographic coverage in Afghanistan was limited to Kabul,

Herat, Jalalabad, and surrounding rural areas, as well as Peshawar and Islamabad in

Pakistan. Given these limitations, the findings are not representative or comprehensive.

But the results clearly indicate that the most urgent human rights concerns of Afghans

and aid workers are being systematically ignored in the reconstruction process.

The failure of the international community to act on local human rights priorities is not

simply a matter of ignoring formal legal obligations. Continuing to disregard human

rights abuses in the political and development spheres will undermine the basis for

reconstruction in Afghanistan and set a dangerous precedent for future crises. With the

situation deteriorating quickly, the major influential outside powers – the United States,

the World Bank, and the United Nations – must adopt urgent measures to support

Afghan aspirations for peace, security and development.

The attacks of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing United States-led military campaign

in Afghanistan, have focused world attention on this devastated nation. For the past 23

years, foreign interventions have fueled a series of brutal wars that entrenched the power

of unaccountable warlords, divided the country along ethnic lines, and destroyed its

already-limited infrastructure and economic base. During this period the people of

Afghanistan experienced widespread violations of all their fundamental human rights,

ranging from political killings to systematic impoverishment. The contribution of

outside powers to these abuses undermined the possibility of an effective collective

response.

Policymakers in the US have publicly described the military campaign in Afghanistan to

oust the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda as the first front in a wider war against terrorism.

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In this context, the international community’s public commitment to help Afghans

rebuild their society has assumed global significance as a precedent for the viability of

humanitarian engagement after 11 September. Inside Afghanistan, there is guarded

optimism about the future, with hopes for international action to break the power of

warlords and to ensure that the benefits of development reach those in greatest need of

it. Throughout the world, the reconstruction of Afghanistan is seen as a litmus test for

whether the universal values of human rights and development will help define the

parameters of global security, or whether the narrow military interests of powerful states

will predominate. At stake is not only the ability of Afghans to enjoy their fundamental

rights, but the very legitimacy of the United Nations as the unbiased guardian of

international law and guarantor of peace and security for all peoples of the world.

The mission surveyed Afghans from all walks of life, asking them to

rank their most important human rights priorities and express their

views on international reconstruction. Respondents expressed

different shades of hope, despair, expectation, anger and cynicism –

but all shared a conviction that human rights were essential and that

international assistance was not an act of charity but a moral

imperative to make amends for destructive interventions in the past.

Urban respondents overwhelmingly selected peace and security as the

top priority (57%), followed by work (16%) and education (12%).

They viewed peace as critical because cities have borne the brunt of war damage and

have the highest concentration of soldiers. Many expressed concern that the UN had

sanctioned the return to power of brutal and corrupt warlords, both in Kabul and at the

local level. They insisted that without an international force to maintain peace, disarm

warlords, oversee the transition to a more representative government and establish

mechanisms for human rights accountability, Afghanistan was likely

to slide into renewed war once the world’s attention shifted to the next

global crisis.

By contrast, the first priority in rural areas was food security (42%),

followed by peace and security (29%) and education (12%). This

reflects the ongoing food crisis caused by war, displacement, drought,

and poor harvests. The crisis will cause further rural to urban

migration, delay the repatriation of refugees and undermine

development unless there is a concerted international effort to target aid directly to

remote rural areas hit hardest by hunger. For both rural and urban respondents,

education was seen as the only path for their children to escape poverty. Lack of

Kunar province

in Herat city

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education within the current political and military leadership was blamed

for the persistence of war and poverty.

Both men (42%) and women (39%) placed a high priority on peace, but

for women food was the first priority (49% compared to 22% for men),

whereas men placed greater value than women on work (14% to 0%).

These findings indicate greater female responsibility for feeding and

caring for families, and male reluctance to accept food assistance despite concerns about

earning enough income for the family.

The survey also asked who should implement the reconstruction program to ensure

human rights. The majority responded that the UN should be primarily responsible

either on its own (49%) or together with the interim government (31%). A minority

(20%) thought that Afghan authorities, either central or local, should be primarily

responsible. These results reflect deep distrust of government authorities but also high

hopes that the international community will follow through on public commitments to

assist Afghanistan.

Afghan respondents universally disputed the importance of ethnicity as divisive factor

among the general population. Blame for ethnic tensions was attributed to military

factions and their foreign sponsors, for building regional power bases along ethnic lines

and continuing to manipulate ethnicity as a pretext for political revenge and looting.

Many expressed fear that ethnically targeted human rights abuses by these factions,

especially in the north, could undermine the social cohesion of the country for years to

come. The UN was criticized for feeding into false ethnic divisions at the behest of

Afghan leaders rather than working to bring ordinary people together around issues of

city

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

P1 Male (N=42)

P1 Female (N=10)

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Respondents objected to continued US bombings and its arming of selected warlords.

This was seen as the same mistaken policy that had already militarized their country

along factional lines. International aid workers were particularly concerned that the US

military policy was working at cross-purposes with UN reconstruction policy by laying

the seeds for future violence and instability. In fact, many respondents named US

policy as the prime obstacle to disarming warlords, extending international protection

beyond Kabul, and instituting human rights accountability throughout the country.

elder, Peshawar refugee camp.

Soon after it became clear that the US and its allies were determined to topple the

Taliban, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UNDP organized a series of

meetings to plan reconstruction in Afghanistan. This process culminated in a major

conference of donors in Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002, at which donors pledged $4.5

billion over 2.5 years based on cost estimates from a

“Preliminary Needs Assessment” prepared largely by the World

Bank. The methodology for cost estimates apparently relied on

examples of unidentified African and Asian countries that have

received international assistance in the range of $40-80 per capita

annually for post-conflict recovery programs. In contrast,

international aid to the Balkans, the Palestinian Occupied

Territories, and East Timor has ranged from $200-300 per capita annually. Comparable

levels of aid would translate into an annual figure of at least $5 billion for Afghanistan –

three times greater than the Tokyo pledges.

Afghans and aid workers interviewed for this report expressed strong criticism of the

top-down nature of the entire reconstruction process. Despite talk in the Needs

Assessment on the imperative to “see Afghanistan through the eyes of Afghans”, the

key documents were prepared largely in Washington with no time for meaningful input

from the field. This resulted in what was termed a “cookie-cutter” approach to

development – a set of broad principles that could apply to any

number of countries, without a strategic framework to guide

implementation of specifically-identified priorities of Afghan

communities. The generic nature of the recommendation led

many respondents to fear that the World Bank might insist on a

standard privatization program without adequate appreciation of

the desperate need for basic public sector services throughout the

country.

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Most respondents agreed that effective reconstruction was key to peace and stability,

and that emergency programs with quick impact were necessary to provide immediate

income support, create jobs for demobilized soldiers, and provide concrete evidence of

international commitment to Afghanistan. At the same time, there was concern that

international pressure for visible results would skew programs towards urban areas. As

There is a clear international consensus, backed by binding legal commitments, to

guarantee human rights in the development process. The UN Charter links “universal

respect for, and observance of, human rights” with “economic and social progress and

development”, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights joins civil, political,

economic, social and cultural human rights together as “the foundation of freedom,

justice and peace in the world”. Almost all states in the world, including Afghanistan,

have ratified major human rights treaties obligating them to respect the full range of

human rights.

The most influential actors in the reconstruction process have used the language of

human rights. The US and its allies have publicly committed to help the Afghan people

achieve peace, security and respect for human rights. The World Bank’s Needs

Assessment emphasized “promoting and protecting human rights” and “promoting

social, economic and political inclusion of vulnerable groups”. In the Bonn Agreement,

the international community and Afghan political representatives agreed: “The United

Nations shall have the right to investigate human rights violations and where necessary,

recommend corrective action.” The Security Council, in resolution 1401 of 28 March

2002, expressly conditioned development aid on improved human rights performance.

Moreover, Afghanistan had been named as a test case for the Secretary General’s reform

process initiated in 1997, which required all UN organs and agencies to mainstream

human rights into all development activities.

The $4.5 billion reconstruction process presents an important opportunity to put

international commitments into practice through rights-based development that

prioritizes basic needs, particularly of vulnerable communities, guarantees local

participation, addresses the root causes of poverty, and establishes procedures for

accountability and remedies. Political and economic conditions in Afghanistan are so

desperate that any human rights measures can have immediate benefits. From Chairman

Hamid Karzai on down, most Afghans support firm human rights measures. Though the

interim administration in Kabul is dominated by leaders with questionable human rights

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records, a national loya jirga is meeting to establish a more representative and legitimate

political authority. The UN is still in the process of defining the role of human rights in

its organizational structures and operational programs, but has clear public commitments

to design and implement programs according to Afghan human rights priorities.

Yet according to Afghans and aid workers, there remains a wide gap between rhetorical

commitments and real actions on the ground. The US has rejected pleas from top

Afghan and UN policymakers to limit its ongoing military campaign and support the

expansion of international protection forces. The World Bank has rushed through a

reconstruction plan that bypasses Afghan opinion and international field experience.

UN agencies are designing development programs without human rights principles and

safeguards. The international community as a whole had lent legitimacy to a political

process through which regional and local warlords have re-imposed their rule without

facing human rights accountability, even for current abuses. In effect, all international

parties have disregarded Afghan requests to establish an accountability process for past

crimes, investigate current crimes, and prioritize human rights in development

programs. Until the international community fulfills its clearly established and publicly

recognized human rights obligations, the prospects for peace and development in

Afghanistan will remain clouded. And the window for taking on these challenges is

rapidly closing.

The international community – the US in particular – has a double responsibility

towards the Afghan people: first for supplying a constant stream of arms to ruthless

military commanders over the past two decades, and second, for failing to establish

human rights accountability in the current reconstruction process. The main

justification for ignoring human rights concerns is the fear that newly re-empowered

warlords might threaten the country’s stability if their dominion is challenged. But

failure to establish accountability mechanisms today can only entrench a culture of

impunity and undermine any hope for long-term stability. And if the international

community lacks resolve to challenge human rights abuses today, it seems unlikely that

such resolve will materialize in the future.

The Center for Economic and Social Rights therefore proposes the following

recommendations in support of the overwhelming Afghan consensus, from Chairman

Karzai to ordinary citizens, in favor of human rights accountability and rights-based

development.

Afghan aspirations for human rights, especially during the crucial transition to

more permanent political arrangements. If the international community fails to

publicly support key human rights initiatives during the convening of the

national loya jirga, it is likely that the rule of impunity will become entrenched

in the new government. These initiatives, which have been urgently requested

by Chairman Karzai and other Afghan leaders, include:

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insecure areas like the north, to document current abuses and deter future

ones.

national army and police force is in place to assume security responsibilities.

local militias, using economic incentives such as providing demobilized

soldiers with jobs in rural reconstruction.

evidence a pattern of under-resourcing and marginalizing the human rights

component for political expediency, with negative impact on people’s security

and enjoyment of human rights. The current structure for UN Assistance

Mission to Afghanistan appears to improve on this pattern by integrating human

rights into the mission’s political and development pillars. However, it will

require significant political will to follow through on establishing accountability

procedures for Afghan leaders, and significant financial resources to ensure that

reconstruction effort incorporates rights-based programming throughout its

operations. UNAMA must ensure that there political and financial support a full

range of human rights activities, including:

Afghan NGOs to build national and local capacity.

banks and UN agencies, on implementing rights-based programming.

human rights activities as outside of its mandate. Yet, in assuming leadership of

the overall reconstruction effort, the Bank also assumed responsibility for

incorporating human rights principles in all reconstruction programs, in tandem

with implementing partners such as UN agencies and NGOs. This means giving

practical effect to the Bank’s rhetorical human rights commitments in the Needs

Assessment by dedicating sufficient resources to fulfill the main elements of

rights-base programming:

policy and planning.

objectives, including in staffing and budget decisions.

establish baselines and benchmarks, and address root causes of economic

deprivation.

programs.

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improvement of people’s living standards as called for in human rights

treaties.

placed, to determine their own priorities. The purpose of a comprehensive

human rights needs assessment is to ensure that reconstruction programs are

based on priorities expressed by Afghans themselves. Such assessment is also a

tool for enabling community participation and providing a check against

corruption and waste. The assessment should be carried out through

collaboration of UN agencies, NGOs, and independent researchers, and in close

consultation with Afghan authorities. The assessment team should:

of vulnerable groups.

development.

programming.

local conditions.

capitalizing on hopes for the future, the UN and Afghan authorities should

launch a national campaign of human rights education. Similar to South Africa’s

successful campaign to increase popular participation in its constitutional

process, it should center on a grassroots process of public meetings with diverse

communities. The campaign should begin with village level events to develop

popular awareness of human rights and allow people the opportunity to express

their views on justice. These should build into regional meetings and culminate

in a national truth commission to address broad issues of accountability and

reconciliation.

provide concrete assistance to the overwhelming Afghan consensus in favor of

human rights by building local capacity. Over the long term, this will entail

political and financial support for national institutions, including the Human

Rights Commission and the Judicial Commission, and measures to develop

legislation and legal procedures that provide access to justice and conform to

international standards. In the short term the focus should be on supporting

independent monitoring and advocacy capacity among local NGOs.

the best safeguard against human rights violations in development. While

UNAMA’s human rights program and the National Human Rights Commission

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will play important roles, it would also be valuable to establish an independent

Afghan institution to evaluate and monitor human rights in the reconstruction

process. The institute would document abuses by both Afghan and international

authorities and seek to minimize the inevitable corruption and waste associated

with large-scale reconstruction. Potentially affiliated to Kabul University, the

institute should be staffed by independent professionals with unquestioned

integrity and proven research skills.

international human rights and humanitarian action depend upon a clear

separation from all military campaigns. US policy in Afghanistan has blurred

this fundamental distinction, with negative consequences for future international

missions. While US financial and political support is critical to the success of

the reconstruction process, such support must be contributed within the

framework of international law and governance. For example, US provision of

food aid should be carried out through UN structures rather than under

independent military authority. And despite obvious political constraints, the

UN should condemn those US military policies that directly contravene the

purpose of the international mission,

9. While the foregoing recommendations are directed towards the United Nations

and World Bank, it is evident that little progress is possible without a significant

policy shift by the United States. As the leading power in the UN system and

the main external military force in Afghanistan, the US had used its decisive

influence to veto the expansion of peacekeeping forces and continue arming

factional warlords, at the same time failing to support human rights

accountability and protection. These policies will only foster impunity,

instability, and violence within and beyond Afghanistan. To avoid this outcome,

the US government must make a meaningful public commitment to peace and

security in Afghanistan based on explicit recognition of and support for human

rights and democratic development. Specifically the US government should

agree to:

property by establishing a well-funded compensation program for Afghan

victims.

southern Afghanistan that are currently closed for military reasons.

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This report is based on information collected during a human rights assessment mission,

conducted by the Center for Economic and Social Rights, in Pakistan and Afghanistan

in January 2002. The CESR mission interviewed a cross-section of Afghan leaders and

ordinary citizens, as well as international aid workers. Its main purpose was to provide

a platform for Afghan and international voices to define their own priorities for human

rights and reconstruction. The mission was also intended as a preliminary step towards

a more comprehensive analytical profile that identifies the human rights challenges in

Afghanistan and proposes concrete measures to meet these challenges.

In addition to this introduction, the report consists of the following chapters and

annexes:

cross-section of Afghan society.

primarily with UN agencies.

the international reconstruction process.

obligations of Afghan authorities, UN agencies, and other development actors.

interviews, and follow-up steps for further research and analysis.

facts and figures relating to development.

Since the Soviet invasion of 1979, the people of Afghanistan have experienced an

unbroken series of wars and conflicts. In a modern version of the “Great Game”,

superpower and regional rivals vying for influence over strategic trade and oil pipeline

routes funneled billions of dollars of advanced weapons to a ruthless clique of Afghan

warlords and Islamic militants. During this period, political power shifted from

traditional community-based systems that allowed for a measure of popular participation

to ethnically and religiously based military factions who ruled through force of arms.

As a result, the country grew increasingly divided and militarized, with outside powers

fueling continuous conflict while the population sank deeper into lawlessness and

poverty.

The human consequences have been disastrous. Between one and two million Afghans

died in these wars, over one third of the population was forced to flee their homes, and

even the limited infrastructure was destroyed. Today only one in ten Afghans has

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access to sanitation, one woman in five is literate, and one quarter of all children do not

live to see their fifth birthday. Meanwhile, the powerful enjoy unchallenged impunity

for all manner of human rights abuses.

Until 11 September 2001, the plight of Afghanistan passed largely unnoticed by the

outside world. Humanitarian agencies struggled to cope with the catastrophe with

limited resources, but the broader international community made little effort to address

the crisis, apart from imposing economic sanctions that harmed ordinary Afghans more

than the Taliban regime.

After 11 September, Afghanistan suddenly took center stage as the initial front in a

newly declared global war on terrorism. Public justifications for the US-led military

effort in Afghanistan focused not only on the threat posed by al-Qaeda, but also on the

Taliban’s abusive human rights practices, especially regarding women. However, the

bombing campaign added to the nation’s hardship by causing a new wave of refugees

and displaced people, and disrupting international aid efforts at a time when the human

security of over five million people were already deemed at risk due to drought and past

conflict.

The defeat of the Taliban removed one source of human rights violations, but also

restored the power of local warlords and raised the question of international

involvement in nation-building. The international community appeared united on the

crucial importance of addressing the devastation in Afghanistan. Over $4.5 billion was

pledged at an international conference organized by the World Bank, the Asian

Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme. There was talk

of not repeating the previous mistake when international attention turned away from

Afghanistan following the defeat of the Soviet-backed regime, leading to a period of

factional violence and human rights abuses that spurred the rise of the Taliban. Adding

to the optimism was a sense of war fatigue and desperation among the Afghan

population, with a clear public consensus in favor of ending lawlessness and impunity

and rebuilding a multi-ethnic nation. The extraordinary levels of poverty throughout

Afghanistan also indicated that properly targeted development programs could have a

significant impact in addressing people’s immediate and desperate needs.

However, several months into the reconstruction effort, the warning signs are

unmistakable. The UN is backing an interim government that is widely seen as

unrepresentative and illegitimate, with many notorious human rights abusers at highlevel

posts. The US is arming handpicked warlords and refusing to support the

expansion of international security measures outside of Kabul. Worst of all, UN and US

policymakers are ignoring calls by Afghan leaders and ordinary citizens, as well as

experienced international aid workers, for greater attention to human rights and security

issues in the reconstruction process. There is a grave danger that, as Afghanistan is

displaced from international headlines by the next crisis, these trends will undermine the

entire reconstruction effort.

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The success or failure of international reconstruction will have profound implications

for Afghans and the world at large. The outcome is widely seen as a litmus test for

whether the universal values of human rights and development will help define the

parameters of global security after 11 September, or whether the narrow military

interests of powerful states will predominate. At stake is not only the ability of Afghans

to enjoy their fundamental rights, but also the legitimacy of the United Nations as the

unbiased guardian of international law.

It was in this context that CESR undertook a human rights mission to Afghanistan. The

overall purpose was to provide a snapshot of human rights concerns and priorities in

Afghanistan, as expressed in interviews by Afghans themselves as well as by

international aid staff. The three primary goals of the mission were to:

1. Develop a preliminary profile of human rights concerns based on locally

expressed perspectives and priorities;

2. Contribute to an understanding of Afghan perspectives on human rights so that

the international aid effort is better informed and positioned to address these

concerns in relief and recovery programs;

3. Identify additional research and analysis needed to develop a comprehensive

analytical profile of human rights priorities, including the factors impacting the

ability of Afghans to enjoy human rights.

The mission was comprised of four experts in international human rights law, public

health, minority rights, and development economics, three of whom are nationals of

South-Central Asia and speak local languages. Local facilitators and translators joined

the team in Afghanistan. The mission divided into two assessment teams and visited

the cities of Peshawar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kabul, as well as rural areas in Herat and

Nangarhar provinces. The teams were not restricted by UN security guidelines inside

Afghanistan and thus able to travel freely by road and stop to interview people at

random.

The mission collected and analyzed the views of a cross-section of Afghans and

international aid staff in four main categories: 1) interviews with individual Afghans

(n=52); 2) focus group interviews with Afghan communities (n=58); 3) interviews with

Afghan leaders and intellectuals (n=25); and 4) interviews with UN and NGO personnel

(n=42).

1. Individual interviews were randomly selected and efforts were made to ensure a

private setting and to avoid crowds of onlookers. We often interviewed people

in their homes or while walking on roads or working in fields. All individual

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (DRAFT)

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personal information including name, age, sex, birthplace, and education.

Section Two asked about current living conditions, such as access to food, health

care, and education. Section Three focused on human rights priorities and

expectations for relief and recovery from government and international

authorities.

2. There is a tendency in Afghan society, especially in rural areas, to gather in

groups around an interview, with elders taking the lead and speaking on behalf

of the community. In several villages interviews naturally assumed a group

dynamic and it was considered disrespectful not to include everyone who had

gathered. We also arranged several focus group discussions on human rights and

development issues with tribal elders, teachers, students, and NGO directors.

3. Afghan educators, intellectuals, and political leaders, including representatives

of the Afghan Interim Administration, were asked for their views on the political

process and the role of human rights in relief and recovery efforts. Arranging

meetings with ministry officials was a significant challenge at the time. With the

Tokyo conference a few days away, the ministries had no funds to pay salaries,

yet were constantly engaged in meetings with UN and aid officials to discuss